

























June 2008  











CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICITS IN 
EUROPEAN EMERGING MARKETS 
 
 











UNITED NATIONS  
 
CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICITS IN EUROPEAN EMERGING MARKETS 





Many of the emerging market economies in Europe are presently running 
current account deficits which are quite high relative to any global or historical 
standard and are fundamentally unsustainable. This includes the three poorer 
European Union (EU) members of the old Europe (Greece, Portugal, and Spain), 
many of the EU’s new member states (largely the former transition economies which 
have joined since 2004), most of those non-EU members in south-east Europe, and a 
number of the CIS economies in eastern Europe and the Caucasus. The unweighted 
average current account deficit for this group has more than doubled from under 
four percent of GDP in 2003 to well over eight percent in 2007.  This trend is 
significantly different than what has evolved in many of the world’s other emerging 
markets; these other economies have generally been running current account 
surpluses. This paper documents this development, describes the underlying factors 
that have brought it about, assesses the underlying vulnerability that has been 
created, and discusses the implications of this development for other emerging 
markets and global financial stability more generally. In addition, how these risks 
have evolved since the appearance of the global credit crisis beginning in the 
summer of 2007 is examined.   
 
I. European Emerging Market Deficits 
 
The use of foreign savings to finance investment in emerging economies was 
what was initially expected to happen once financial markets became globalized. The 
scarcity of capital in the developing world compared to the advanced economies was 
expected to give rise to capital flows to these economies. This was also the expectation 
behind the consensus developed at the Monterrey conference in 2002 regarding 
Financing for Development. However many emerging economies are now not receiving 
net foreign capital inflows but are actually exporting capital to the advanced economies. 
The surpluses of China and the deficits of the U.S. are a well publicized example of this 
so-called “upward” flow of capital but a significant number of emerging markets, 
especially those in Asia and Latin America, are also running surpluses. In figure 1 the 
projected current accounts in 2008 of the world economies are provided, with those in tan 
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Zimny (UNECE).    having surpluses and those in green having deficits; those in dark green have deficits 
above five percent of GDP. The emerging markets of Europe are a virtual sea of green. 
Latin America and many of the east Asian economies, having suffered numerous 
currency crises in the past, now have surpluses. Although a number of the economies of 
central Africa have deficits, the continent as a whole has a surplus.   
 
As can be seen from figure 1, there are a significant number of economies with 
projected 2008 deficits as there has been in the last several years; restricting the sample to 
those with IMF balance of payments data (in the 2007 yearbook), there were 89 
economies with deficits in 2005 and 80 in 2006.  The total value of all the current account 
deficits in 2006 was $1.347 trillion; however if the 8 advanced economics (which 
includes the U.S.) are excluded there were 72 emerging market economies with a total 
deficit of $319 billion. Of this group, 24 are European emerging markets which had 
deficits totaling $249 billion or 78.2 percent of the total of all emerging markets with 
current account deficits. The current account of Spain alone is greater than that of all the 
non-European emerging market deficits combined. Thus in value terms, a discussion of 
emerging market current account deficits is basically a discussion of European emerging 
market deficits.      
Figure 1 
World Current Accounts in 2008 




In appendix tables 1 and 2 the current account deficits for the emerging European 
economies are provided for the 1998-2007 period. The analysis in this paper focuses on 
27 emerging market economies in Europe (EEM). This includes the three southern and 
poorest “old” members of the EU-15 (SEU-3), the 12 EU new member states (NMS), 7 
economies in south-east Europe including Turkey (SSE-7), and 5 of the CIS in Europe 
and the Caucasus (CIS-5). The current account trends for these four basic regions are 
presented in chart 1.  Russia is not included in this study because it is not typical of these 
other economies in that it has been running sizable current account surpluses due to its 
  2extensive energy exports. However, data is not always available for all 27 countries 
covering the entire period, and thus smaller samples are sometimes used when examining 
time trends. Thus the discussion in the previous paragraph excluded Montenegro (which 
only became independent in 2006), Serbia (whose borders are in flux), and Slovakia 
(which does not produce timely balance of payments data.)  
 
Chart 1 















































Projected Current Account Deficits in Emerging Europe in 2008 
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Figure 2 provides a detailed graphical presentation of the projected current 
accounts for 2008 in emerging Europe with fives shades of green; the darker the green, 
the larger the deficit (as a percent of GDP).  None of the 27 emerging European 
economies (selected for this study) has a surplus: a few (Armenia, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Slovenia) have fairly reasonably sized deficits of under five percent of GDP; 
most of central Europe has a current account deficit in the five to ten percent range, 
which is also the case for Cyprus, Malta, Portugal, and Turkey. The remaining countries, 
primarily the three Baltic economies, Greece, Spain, and several in south-east Europe  
have truly large current account deficits. Latvia tops the list with a projected current 
account deficit of 27.3 percent of GDP in 2008. In evaluating the potential vulnerability 
of these deficits it is worth noting that the 1996 average un-weighted current account 
deficit in the five Asian economies (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and 
Thailand) that were at the core of the 1997 Asian financial crisis was only about 5 percent 
of GDP; these economies like their European counterparts today had reasonably good 
fiscal positions and were experiencing a period of strong economic growth. Also note that 
Turkey’s current account deficit was only 4.9 percent of GDP in the year prior to its 2001 
currency collapse and Russia even had a surplus 1997 prior to its crisis in 1998.
1  
 
  These increasing large current account deficits are occurring in a global 
environment where countries are increasingly running sizable current account 
imbalances, either deficits or surpluses. According to WTO (2007) calculations, the 
typical OECD country with a surplus has had its magnitude increase from two percent of 
GDP in 1990 to over six percent of GDP in 2006, while the typical OECD economy with 
a deficit has had its magnitude increase from approximately two and a half percent of 
GDP in 1990 to almost six percent in 2006. Stated another way, the absolute value of the 
typical OECD current account has tripled from two percent of GDP in 1990 to six percent 
of GDP in 2006. Thus the relatively low levels of international capital transfers and the 
corresponding home bias first observed by Feldstein-Horika (1980) appear to have 
undergone a major structural shift in the last decade.      
 
Some of the European emerging economies (Greece, Portugal, Slovenia, and 
Spain; and most recently Cyprus and Malta) are members of the eurozone. Others such as 
the remaining 9 EU New Member States (NMS) are members of the EU. Empirical 
research has shown that being in the EU increases the magnitude of the absolute value of 
the current account as a percentage of GDP while being in the eurozone increases it 
further (Blanchard and Glavazzi, 2002). According to their analysis, the so-called 
Feldstein-Horioka β estimate of the correlation between savings and investment was only 
.14 in the eurozone during 1991-2001. This suggests that in the eurozone investment is 
now largely independent of savings with the difference readily financed by a capital 
inflow.  
 
It is worth always re-emphasizing when dealing with the (former transition) 
economies that the data are often of a very poor quality and what are available often 
differ quite significantly from one database to another. Recent balance of payments data 
are typically revised considerably and thus changes in the values of recent entries are to 
                                                 
1 Subsequent revisions of the data years later produced a trivial current account deficit in 1997.   
  4be expected. However major inconsistencies in data several years old in recent databases 
from international organizations are generally rare but are much more common in data 
from this region. For example, a comparison of Albania’s current account deficit in 2001 
shows that according to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
November 2007 dataset (released with its 2007 Transition Report) it was 6.3 percent of 
GDP; the October 2007 International Monetary Fund Economic Outlook database gives a 
figure of 3.6 percent of GDP; the World Bank World Development Indicators database at 
the end of December 2007 had a value of 5.3 percent of GDP which was similar to that in 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe on-line database. However, the 
similarity of the last two sources does not provide much comfort, as they have different 
values for 2005. Why are they different in 2005? They have the same dollar value for the 
current account but different dollar values for GDP. Which GDP is correct? Neither the 
Albanian Central Bank nor the National Statistical Office produce official dollar GDP 
estimates, so their data can not resolve the difference. The Bank of Albania’s estimate of 
its current account deficit was 6.9 percent of GDP (for 2001) in its latest available 2006 
Balance of Payments Bulletin. When doing economic analysis drawing together different 
economic variables from different sources one often ends up having to combine data 
from databases which have inconsistent data for variables that they may share. It is 
therefore important to appreciate these data limitations and what their implications may 
be.   
 
II. When Do Current Account Deficits Become Problematic? 
  
There are many previous episodes when emerging markets had large current 
account deficits and many of these episodes ended quite poorly with some form of 
financial or currency crisis. A basic question that must be addressed is whether the 
current situation in emerging Europe is similar to these other episodes and is thus likely 
to turn out in a similar manner, or if the nature of these capital flows or the environment 
in which they are occurring is fundamentally different from these earlier episodes. An 
affirmative answer to this latter question, however, is no guarantee that this situation will 
still not turn out poorly, as the history of currency and financial crises has been one of 
constantly changing causes. For example, the debt crises of the early 1980s were the 
result of government borrowing to maintain living standards in an environment of 
escalating energy prices while the financial crises centered in Asian in the late 1990s had 
more to do with private financial market excesses and the failure of governments to 
establish the proper institutional regulatory mechanisms for their increasingly open 
financial sectors. Thus just because emerging Europe is not repeating the specific 
mistakes of the past does not imply that they are not repeating the more general mistake 
of having an over reliance on foreign capital. However, if the situation is truly different 
and emerging Europe has established a model whereby economies can borrow heavily 
abroad and grow and prosper as a result, then the current situation has very important 
implications for global development.        
   
Current accounts deficits, which last for more than a transitory period are often 
perceived to represent an obvious economic problem, like inflation or unemployment that 
require a policy induced adjustment. Typical of this thinking is the concern that has been 
raised about the U.S. current account deficit and the calls of various kinds for policy 
action to address it.  However, from a more theoretical point of view, when the current 
  5account deficit is the result of rational private sector saving and investment decisions and 
there are no market distortions, there is no generally agreed upon justification for 
government action to reduce the current account deficit since (in most economic models) 
none of the usual policies can be shown to increase intertemporal social welfare. This 
would appear to be the case even in instances where the current account deficit is so large 
as to be unsustainable in the long run. In this case market participants supposedly will 
adjust their savings and investment decisions as time goes on in such a manner as to bring 
about the economically efficient adjustment (Blanchard, 2007). The introduction of a 
government which runs a fiscal surplus or deficit complicates this conclusion, but even in 
this case it is not absolutely clear (from a theoretical perspective) that the reduction of a 
government deficit to improve a current account deficit is necessarily a welfare 
increasing policy. The obvious qualification to these conclusions is whether or not there 
are widespread distortions or market failures that would invalidate them. 
 
A current account is often viewed to be problematic if it is unsustainable. 
Unsustainable is usually defined as a situation in which the current account is creating an 
increasing debt to GDP ratio; clearly this ratio cannot keep increasing indefinitely. The 
general rule connecting the current account, which is a flow, to the debt which is a stock, 
is that the country’s growth rate (g) times the desired or upper limit debt-GDP ratio (d), 
gives the current account (ca) that is sustainable. That being,  
 
g · d = ca   (1) 
 
The maximum likely growth rate for emerging European economies is likely to be 
in the range to 4 to 6 percent a year. It is less clear what the desired or maximum debt 
ratio should be, but it is generally felt that it is undesirable to have an external debt ratio 
over 60 to 80 percent of GDP. Combing these two figures implies that a current account 
deficit greater than 2.5 to 5 percent of GDP is unsustainable if it is financed by debt.  
 
The current debt to GDP ratios in some European emerging economies are 
currently at or well over this “maximum” level and for some are at quite worrisome 
levels. For example the debt ratio for Latvia was 118 percent of GDP in 2006 and is 
likely to stay above 100 percent for the next several years. The debt to GDP ratios for a 
number of other European economies are already quite high, being over 100 percent in 
Hungary (109 percent) and Estonia (101 percent) and over 50 percent in Croatia (90 
percent), Slovenia (82 percent), Moldova (70 percent), Serbia (69 percent), Bulgaria (68 
percent), Lithuania (64 percent), Slovakia (58 percent), Ukraine (52 percent), and 
Romania (51 percent).  The debt levels of the European emerging markets are put into a 
more global perspective in figure 3.  
 
In chart 2 the evolution of long-term debt (LDOD) in the European emerging 
markets over 1995-2007 is plotted. For most countries most of their debt is long-term 
debt (i.e., figures for total LDOD represent most of their total external debt (EDT) in the 
IMF Global Development Finance on-line database).  Due to limited data availability, the 
three older EU members (Greece, Portugal, and Spain) are not included in this chart. 
Long-term debt slowly increased between 1995 and 2001, but it was in 2002 that debt 
began to increase much more rapidly. Perhaps the most important structural shift in this 
debt was that most of the increase was due to the rapid growth of private debt; public 
  6debt remained relatively constant throughout this period.  Undoubtedly this shift from 
public debt to private debt has a number of important implications for the region. For 
example, there are a number of significant institutional mechanisms that have been set up 
through the years (Paris Club, HIPC, etc) to help countries cope with problems related to 
public debt but there is far less international support for dealing with problems related to 
private debt.   
 
Figure 3 

















































































  7 
Several economies, however, do have significant short-term debt; for example, it 
accounts for over 40 percent of total debt in Latvia, Lithuania, and the Slovak Republic. 
A significant amount of this is banking debt (often borrowed from parent banks in 
western Europe) and is borrowed in euros. In these economies, a currency depreciation 
could result in significant balance sheet problems for the banking sector. Some of this 
borrowed foreign currency has been loaned domestically in euro-denominated loans; this 
has reduced the direct expose of the banking sector to currency risks, but the risks have 
simply been shifted on to consumers and businesses that may not be prepared to deal with 
them. As a result these banks’ lessened vulnerability from exchange rate losses due to a 
depreciation has been replaced by an increased vulnerability from borrower defaults.      
 
Of course not every dollar of net capital inflow (current account deficit) creates a 
dollar of debt as formally defined, as equity inflows do not produce debt. Nevertheless 
they do produce a “similar” foreign claim on domestic output but it is less clear what the 
upper limit for this “foreign claim” should be. Thus when the current account is financed 
by equity flows (especially foreign direct investment) as opposed to debt, it is less clear 
what level is unsustainable. Current account deficits financed by FDI are thought to be 
less problematic from a macroeconomic stability point of view, as FDI flows are 
generally found to be less volatile than other forms of capital inflow (portfolio equity and 
debt), and unlike debt, which is fixed in nominal terms, the market value of equity 
investments is re-priced as conditions evolve.  This is a very important consideration for 
the region since a large proportion of the current accounts are covered by FDI in many of 
the economies. 
 
In analyzing the vulnerability of these economies to a capital account crisis, it 
may be useful to separate the longer-term and more stable capital inflows from the more 
volatile short-term flows. Historically under the old Bretton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates, long-run capital inflows were added to the current account to create what 
was referred to as the basic balance. With the movement to flexible exchange rates this 
balance of payments concept has been seldom used; for example the U.S. stopped 
calculating it in 1976. This measure is not currently produced as part of the IMF’s 
balance of payments presentations, and which balance of payment entries should be 
included in its calculation is subject to some judgment. Nevertheless some type of basic 
balance concept may be more appropriate than the current account for analyzing the 
present economic situation of the European emerging markets. Thus a slightly adjusted 
basic balance is defined here as the current account plus FDI inflows.  In chart 3 the 
current accounts for 2007 are given in red along with this slightly adjusted basic balance 
(in green). As the chart demonstrates the (slightly modified) basic balance deficits are not 
particularly large; they exceed five percent for only Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, 
and Spain.  
 
  However, new projects need not be undertaken and reinvested earning can 
instead be repatriated if economic conditions deteriorate. It should be noted that in 
Malaysia in 1996 the current account (4.6 percent of GDP) was fully financed by net FDI 
inflows (5.3 percent of GDP) and FDI fell by more than half between 1996 and 1998 
($5.08 billion to $2.16 billion). Thus although FDI may be more stable than other types 
of capital inflow and an analysis of the vulnerability posed by a current account deficit 
  8may need to consider the proportion financed by FDI, it is simply incorrect to view FDI 
as invariant to market turmoil.  
 
Chart 3 
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Note: Due to data availability, for countries with an asterisk data are for 2006. 
 
 
An additional consideration concerns the fact that previous FDI investments 
worsen the current account in that the profits appear on the debit side of the investment 
income sub-account of the current account. This includes the re-invested earnings and 
undistributed profits of firms. These latter items do not create an actual demand for 
foreign exchange and thus their inclusion in the current account tends to exaggerate the 
actual need for foreign exchange. The reinvested earnings of domestic firms do not 
appear in the current account although these companies have the same potential ability to 
transfer their funds abroad. Thus economies that have large stocks of FDI, as many of the 
European emerging markets do, have current accounts that probably appear larger due to 
this accounting technicality than they actually are from a more fundamental economic 
perspective. This is not a minor technical point, but one which has very significant 
implications for assessing the current accounts of the region. For example, in 2005 
Estonia’s current account deficit was $1.44 billion, while reinvested earnings were $773 
million, or 53.5 percent of the current account deficit. If this item was not considered as 
part of the current account, Estonia’s current account deficit would have fallen from 10.3 
percent of GDP to only 4.8 percent. 
 
An additional consideration for the EU emerging markets is that they receive a net 
transfer from the EU due to the benefits they get from the EU Social and Cohesion funds; 
these have been and are projected for the next several years to be several percentage 
points of GDP. Normally transfers would appear in the balance of payments above the 
current account line so they would already be included in the current account and no 
  9further adjustment would be warranted. However, it is believed that there are a number of 
accounting idiosyncrasies which have the result of “artificially” enlarging the current 
accounts of the NMS. For example, it is generally thought that these countries’ 
contributions to the EU are usually included above the line, but that their payments from 
the EU, especially for investment projects, are included below the line in the capital 
account. Thus inclusion of all the inward transfers, some of which currently appear in the 
capital account, into a loosely defined basic balance would likely further reduce their 
deficits. It is, however, difficult to quantify the magnitude of this problem due to the 
uncertainty about where these funds have been placed in the BOP statistics.     
 
If all of these adjustments are considered, and if the basic balance deficits are not 
that large, then are the large current account deficits irrelevant?  Besides the qualification 
that FDI inflows do respond in crisis situations, there is still an upper limit to what is 
sustainable. If the capital stock to GDP ratio is assumed to be relatively stable (as in the 
Harrod-Domar growth model) and approximately equal to three, then assuming GDP 
growth of 5 percent means that 15 percent of national income must be devoted to net 
capital accumulation. If depreciation is 10 percent of GDP, then gross investment must be 
25 percent of GDP. Thus anytime the current account is over 25 percent, the actual 
domestic ownership of the capital stock must fall. Thus a current account deficit of 25 
percent of GDP would set an absolute maximum as to what could be considered as 
sustainable even with the much broader interpretation of “foreign claims”. If a country 
desired, however to have at least one-half of the capital stock domestically owned, then 
the maximum sustainable current account deficit would be only 12.5 percent of GDP.  
 
Figure 4 




Just as the type of capital flow is important is assessing the vulnerability it has 
created, so is the degree to which it has led to higher investment and the sector in which 
the investment occurred. Although there is nothing in general undesirable about 
  10investment in real estate, as it provides consumers with an important increase in their 
quality of life, it can be problematic when the capital inflows associated with a large 
current account deficit are channeled into real estate. This is due to the fact that real 
estate generally does not produce significant foreign exchange; the conclusion, however, 
may need to be qualified if the investments are of resort properties with a large 
percentage of foreign buyers. Real estate investment has been quite high in a number of 
the emerging European economies. For example, in Bulgaria almost half of all FDI was 
in construction and real estate in 2007 while manufacturing received slightly less that 4 
percent. To some degree this is due to the fact that investment in housing was relatively 
low during the socialist planning period and there is a current need now to significantly 
upgrade this sector (Palacin and Shelburne, 2005).  Thus the high levels of real estate 
investment in the former transition economies may not be excessive from a more 
fundamental supply and demand perspective, as they may have been in Spain for 
instance, but nevertheless the funds have been used to produce an asset that does not earn 
foreign exchange and is therefore unable to finance itself form a foreign exchange 
perspective.   
 
Of course, these large current account deficits may not be viewed as problematic 
and issues of sustainability may not be relevant if there are believed to be largely 
temporary. However, that is not the case with the European emerging markets. In figure 4 
below the current account deficits as projected by the IMF in its April 2008 Economic 
Outlook are presented. Green represents deficits and dark green deficits of over five 
percent of GDP. All of the 27 economies (which this study focuses on) are projected to 
still have deficits in 2013 – five years from now, and most are projected to have deficits 
above five percent. 
   




Since a current account deficit is an accounting identity equal to the difference 
between national savings and investment, it is important to understand which of the two 
variables is “abnormal” in Europe’s emerging markets.  
 
ca= S – I    (2) 
 
That being, is investment unusually high in the emerging European economies or 
is savings unusually low? With EU membership either obtained or on the way for many 
of these economies, one might think that their integration into this rich market with their 
significantly lower wages would have produced an investment boom. In addition, six of 
these economies (Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain) are already in 
the eurozone, and are thus able to borrow at euro rates without the usual emerging market 
penalty spread. Although investment rates in many of these economies may have been 
trending slightly upward over the last few years, it is nevertheless the case that the overall 
investment to GDP ratio in these economies is relatively close to world averages. 
Appendix table 3 provides data on gross capital formation for these economies and some 
other world aggregates for 1994-2006. In chart 4 some regional trends are compared 
covering the 1986-2006 period. The unweighted average rate of gross capital formation 
  11for emerging Europe was in the upper 20s during the 1980s, fell to about 23 percent of 
GDP during the 1990s and has increased slightly since 2002. Emerging Europe’s 
percentage for gross capital formation was similar to that of a large sample of 96 middle 
income economies (the blue line, which includes all of those with a per capita GNI of 
$906 to $11,115 which covers the range of most of Europe’s emerging economies) during 
the 1980s, below that of this group in the 1990s when Europe’s rate declined, and similar 
to this group since 2000 as Europe’s rate increased back to the levels obtained in the 
1980s. In this sense then, investment in emerging Europe can now be considered roughly 
average compared to comparable emerging market economies. Compared to the world 
average of all economies (the black line), which is weighted down by lower investment 
rates in the least developed and the advanced economies, emerging Europe has slightly 
greater rates of investment. Within the middle income countries, there is significant 
region diversity with East Asia having investment rates of almost ten percentage points 
greater than emerging Europe while Latin America has rates significantly below.  
 
Chart 4 
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A generally similar conclusion is obtained by comparing investment data in the 
IMF  World Economic Database. Using a smaller sample of countries, a weighted 
aggregate for Central, Eastern and Southeast Europe (CES) composed of 14 of the 
European emerging economies is created; this group includes ten NMS (not Cyprus or 
Slovenia) and Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, and Turkey.  Investment in this CES 
aggregate is compared to investment in all emerging and developing economies (143 
countries) in chart 5. Investment in CES is roughly similar now to what it has been for the 
last decade and is slightly below the average of all emerging and developing economies. 
Overall, considering several different datasets the basic conclusion is the same, that being 
that the current account deficits in emerging Europe are not the result of these economies 
having especially high investment rates.  
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Chart 5 
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These results suggest that as a group the large current accounts have not really 
raised investment to levels above other economies. A similar conclusion holds if the 
variation in investment and current accounts amongst European emerging markets is 
examined. Those that have the largest current account deficits have not had higher levels 
of gross capital formation. In chart 6 the average current account over 2004-06 is plotted 
against the average level of gross capital formation. Although there is a slight trend line 
suggesting higher current account deficits are associated with higher rates of capital 
formation, the relationship is not statistically significant and the R-square of this line is 
  13only .06.
2 Thus in conclusion, the region as a whole does not have higher capital 
formation despite the large current accounts deficits (net foreign capital inflows) and 
those economies within the region with the highest current account deficits do not have 
capital formation any greater than those with smaller current account deficits.   
 
It is possible that the different types of capital inflow affect capital formation 
differently. For example, Bosworth and Collins (1999) found that inflows in the form of 
bank loans and bond funds tended to crowd out domestic investment while FDI tended to 
increase it. However, the recent experience of the European emerging markets does not 
support this generalization. In chart 7 the three year average (2004-2006) level of FDI 
inflows as a percent of GDP is plotted against the average (2004-2006) level of gross 
capital formation. The R-squared is zero. The level of FDI which varies quite 
significantly amongst these economies from 0.9 to 17.1 has absolutely no impact on the 
level of capital formation. So this result is consistent with all those discussed above; the 
level of capital inflows doesn’t affect the level of investment in the European emerging 
markets and the fact that the region gets such high level of inflows doesn’t result in the 
region having higher investment relative to other world regions. 
 
Chart 7 
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The other side of the balance of payments identity is gross national savings. In 
chart 8, saving rates for CES Europe (as defined above) is plotted alongside that for all 
emerging and developing economies. As is plainly evident, in the case of savings the 
European economies have been experiencing a long-term decline in national savings and 
now have rates more than ten percentage points below the average for emerging and 
developing economies.   
 
                                                 
2 Because of the lack of data on capital formation for Cyprus, it was dropped from the sample;  five other 
economies lacked data for 2006 and their average level of capital formation is based upon 2004-2005. 
  14It is often alleged that a primary cause of a current account deficit is a fiscal 
deficit, the so-called twin deficits proposition. In the accounting identity a government 
deficit (Sg = T - G) reduces national savings (the sum of private and government savings), 
and thereby creates a current account deficit.  
 
ca= (Sp +Sg) – I   (3) 
 
A question then would be if the very low rates of national savings found in the European 
emerging markets are the result of large government deficits. The reasoning being that 
government deficits increase interest rates which encourages capital inflows and thus a 
current account deficit. Under flexible exchange rates capital inflows would appreciate 
the currency and thus create a larger current account deficit while under fixed rates the 
capital inflow would increase national income and imports (assuming the inflow is not 
fully sterilized which is unlikely). In addition it has been suggested (Griffin, 2002 
addresses the case of Armenia) that for emerging markets the access to foreign capital 
reduces the incentive of the government to collect taxes and this would result in a 
positive relationship between fiscal and current account deficits (through a slightly 
different chain of causality). There is also a generally well-established historical 
relationship between government fiscal deficits and current account crises. Nevertheless, 
although this ceteris paribus relationship is logically rigorous, the empirical relationship 
between the two deficits has not proven to be especially strong in cross-sectional or time 
series comparisons.  
 
Chart 8 
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However, for the European emerging markets government deficits are not 
particularly large; the unweighted average for the 27 economies averaged over 2006-
2007 is only -1.3 percent of GDP. In fact Hungary with a deficit of 7.8 percent of GDP is 
  15the only economy with a deficit over these two years greater 4 percent of GDP.   
Empirically, the relationship between the two deficits for the European emerging markets 
is statistically significant (at the 99 percent level with a t-statistic of 3.47) and the 
magnitude of the relationship is fairly large with a coefficient of -1.65.
3 However, as can 
be seen below in chart 9 the sign is the opposite of that normally assumed; that being, that 
for each one percentage point increase in a government deficit (as a percent of GDP), the 
current account improves by 1.65 percentage points of GDP. There is of course no 
theoretical problem with this result in that the proposed relationship is a ceteris paribus 
accounting identity and essentially assumes that lower public savings does not affect 
private savings or investment. It is, however, possible that lower public saving could 
cause private savings or investment to change by an even larger amount so that the 
overall relationship would be the opposite of the one that would occur if these two latter 
variables were fixed. Given the fairly strong negative relationship between the two 
deficits in the European emerging markets it is worth exploring these other channels.      
 
Chart 9 
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When foreigners lend or make investments in an economy there are several 
factors likely to be important. For an advanced economy, a larger government deficit may 
be associated with a slightly higher interest rate which would attract capital inflows 
which would appreciate the currency or increase income and thereby increase the current 
account deficit. For an emerging market however, the attraction of the higher interest rate 
could be overwhelmed by increased concern about government default risk or a possible 
currency crisis. As a result, larger government deficits could possibly reduce capital 
inflows and thus reduce the current account deficit through income or exchange rate 
channels.  Thus for the European emerging markets, those with better budget situations 
                                                 
3 Based upon a regression with 26 European emerging markets used in this study which took the two-year 
average government deficit and average current account over 2006 and 2007. Hungary was dropped as an 
outlier; however if included, the coefficient is still highly significant and the R-squared is .325.  
  16appear to be able to attract additional funds while there may be a reluctance to invest or 
lend to economies with large budget deficits.   
 
Another possible theoretical reason weakening any positive relationship between 
the two deficits would be the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, whereby a fiscal deficit 
increases private savings so that national savings is unaffected and there would be no 
need for additional foreign borrowing (and a current account deficit). Essentially the 
decrease in Sg creates a corresponding increase in Sp.  
 
An additional consideration is that the current account and the fiscal deficit are 
likely to move in different directions during the economic business cycle. The current 
account is likely to be anti-cyclical; that being, during the boom phase the current 
account deficit is likely to increase as income growth results in import growth. In 
addition, for flexible exchange rate economies, capital inflows are likely to increase 
during the boom and this is likely to appreciate the currency (ceteris paribus) which 
would create another mechanism contributing to a deficit.  The fiscal deficit, however, 
should improve during the boom due to the automatic stabilizers. Thus when the fiscal 
deficit is low, the current account deficit will be high. In terms of the accounting identity, 
the underlying business cycle factors that cause Sg to improve during a boom also cause 
investment (I) to increase, thus negating the simple correlation between Sg and the 
current account (ca).  
 
Overall, however, government borrowing is fairly low in the European emerging 
markets and therefore does not appear responsible for the low savings in these 
economies, and as shown above this borrowing is certainly not responsible for these 
economies’ current account deficits. Instead, the source of both the savings and current 
account problems is low private savings. There would appear to be a number of 
competing explanations as to why private savings are so low in this region. There are 
considerations regarding inter-temporal consumption smoothing: there are two important 
considerations here. Firstly, is the fact that most of these economies (all except the SEU-
3) experienced large income declines during the transition process; as a result consumers 
might be expected to borrow as a way to maintain their longer-run consumption levels. 
Secondly, growth in these economies has been reasonably high since 2000 and, if 
households view this growth is likely to continue, they may choose to borrow now off 
their future income as a way to smooth their consumption through time. Blanchard and 
Glavazzi (2002) argue that current account deficits are to be expected in countries where 
the population has expectations that future economic growth will be relatively high 
compared to other countries, as households in the fastest growers will have the greatest 
demands for increasing consumption (absorption) above current income levels. Despite 
the logic of this forward-looking intertemporal utility maximization savings strategy, 
there is some empirical evidence which suggests that the relationship is the opposite with 
higher per capita income growth being positively related to savings. It is theorized that 
this is explained by habit formation as households are slow to adjust their expenditure 
levels in response to changing income levels, or by the possibility that income and 
savings are increasing for the younger high-saving cohorts while the dis-saving of the 
older retirees is unaffected by growth, so the overall effect is increased savings.       
 
  17Central to this issue is the basic intertemporal consumption smoothing hypothesis 
of the current account as developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). Given that there has 
been a recent spurt of growth in emerging Europe, this theory suggests that savings 
should have increased and the current account improved. A possible reason that it has not 
is offered by Aguiar and Gopinath (2004) who argue that open advanced economies and 
emerging markets respond to a spurt of economic growth differently. When advanced 
economies experience growth, agents tend to view it as a positive transitory income 
shock and they therefore increase savings consistent with this hypothesis. However, when 
a similar growth spurt happens in an emerging market, agents interpret it not as a 
transitory shock but as a sign that there has been a likely increase in long-term growth 
and thus they increase consumption consistent with consumption smoothing. Thus in both 
cases households desire to smooth their consumption over time, but the key difference is 
how agents interpret the implications of recent growth for their expectations about long-
term growth. Thus for emerging Europe, the recent growth has been interpreted by 
residents as meaning that these economies are now in the process of converging towards 
western European living standards and are choosing to borrow now to benefit from this 
slightly ahead of time.       
 
Although the European emerging markets have recently experienced rather strong 
economic growth especially relative to their neighbors in western Europe, their growth 
has not been superior to that of the Asian economies. It seems that a number of the 
arguments advanced above would be especially true for the Asian economies, and thus 
they would be low savers like Europe instead of the high savers that they are.
4 Clearly 
there must be other factors that are important in influencing savings. A few possible 
reasons are discussed below.  
 
  One factor that may account for the relatively low rates of savings in the 
European emerging markets (generally, as well as relative to Asia) is that this group of 
economies is somewhat unique amongst emerging economies in that they are rapidly 
aging societies. Cross-sectional empirical research on savings has found that aging is 
associated with lower savings (as the old dis-save) and investment (due to lower labor 
force growth) with the effect on saving being greater, so that aging societies are more 
likely to run current account deficits (Bosworth and Chodorow-Reich, 2006). In the 
results of these authors as in those of most others, regional dummy or country-fixed 
effects are generally significant as the Asian economies in particular appear to save more 
than the tested variables are able to explain. Thus this factor may be an important reason 
explaining why savings are so low in emerging Europe relative to Asia despite the fact 
that both are fast growing regions.   
 
  Many of the non-European (especially Asian) emerging markets have adopted an 
export-led model of economic development based on under-valued exchange rates; thus a 
current account surplus is a policy goal which has been directly targeted. It appears that 
the export-led model has generated much higher levels of domestic savings, and thus 
even without the benefit of foreign savings, they have had, somewhat paradoxically, even 
                                                 
4 The superior growth performance of Asia is due partly to its more rapid population growth; in most of the 
European emerging markets population growth is low or even negative. As such the per capita income 
growth differences are less than the GDP growth differences.    
  18higher investment rates than those more open to foreign capital. The mechanism as to 
how setting a low exchange rate results in a high savings rate is poorly understood. It is 
possible that the direction of causality could run from savings to the exchange rate. 
Countries with high savings rates due to other reasons may choose an export-led 
development model as a way to maintain aggregate demand and employment (Bernanke, 
2005). They may even discourage capital inflows because they do not feel that they need 
additional capital, and inflows would undermine their exchange rate objectives by 
appreciating the currency.  
  
Alternatively it may be the case that an undervalued exchange rate causes higher 
savings; for example Diaz-Alejandro (1965) argued that a depreciation lowered the real 
wage and shifted the distribution of income from workers to capitalists. Since a major 
component of private savings is business savings and these are derived mainly from 
profits, a policy that increases profits and income to capitalists increases savings. An 
under-valued currency, by raising the prices of all goods (both exports as well as import-
competing goods), is a method to increase profits. Through this channel the exchange rate 
policy can have an important impact on the national savings rate.
5 In the standard current 
account identity as in equation (2), an undervalued exchange rate increases both the 
current account (ca) and private savings (Sp). In emerging Europe, the capital inflows 
have appreciated the currency and this has lowered profits and lowered business savings. 
Note however, that current account surpluses need not always be associated with high 
domestic savings and investment. When financial intermediation is poor and domestic 
savings can not find a productive use at home, capital outflows can depreciate the 
currency and produce a current account surplus combined with low investment and low 
growth. 
 
   There are several additional factors likely to have kept household savings low in 
emerging Europe. In order for households to achieve their desired consumption 
smoothing, they must be able to borrow and save from the financial sector. The banking 
sector is relatively well developed in this region; this has been a significant achievement 
as banking was under developed in transition economies and did not perform its basic 
role in market economies of allocating capital. In order to jump start this sector, banking 
was privatized and often sold to foreigners during the transition process as a way of 
importing modern technology and managerial expertise. The level of foreign ownership 
of banking assets in a number of the EEM is given in chart 10. Although development of 
the financial sector is often promoted as a way to increase domestic savings (by getting 
cash hordes into the banking sector or reducing capital flight), it can also lower savings 
by increasing consumer loans if households were previously liquidity constrained. As 
will be addressed later, the fact that the source of foreign borrowing has in many cases 
been channeled through multinational banks and that they have tended to promote 
foreign-currency denominated loans as a way to minimize their exchange rate risks has 
created an additional vulnerability associated with their current account deficits.      
 
                                                 
5 Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007) have raised this line of thought as part of their thesis that the fear of 
floating is really a fear of appreciation and that this is the result of a government desire to keep the currency 
undervalued as a way to promote savings and investment; they provide empirical evidence that supports 
these relationships.   
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Chart 10 
Percentage of Foreign Ownership of Banking Assets, 2007 

















Another factor reducing household savings in European emerging markets is their 
relatively well developed safety nets and retirement systems. Although these institutions 
were significantly dismantled during the transition process in eastern Europe, they are 
now relatively well developed in these economies (and of course in the SEU-3). Thus 
households do not need to have such high precautionary savings nor do they need such 
high retirement savings as pension systems are now well-established. It is often alleged 
that in Asia savings are high because of the lack of safety nets and retirement systems.  
 
As demonstrated by the recent discussion of the low savings rate in the United 
States, consumers may save little out of current income if their wealth is increasing due to 
asset appreciation. In most of emerging Europe the prices of housing and financial assets 
have been increasing quite rapidly.  Egert and Mihaljek (2007) find that nominal house 
prices in national currency increased at an annual rate during 2002-2006 of 36.4 percent 
in Estonia, 23.8 percent in Lithuania, 23.5 percent in Bulgaria, 11.9 percent in Hungary, 
9.9 percent in Sloveia, 9.8 percent in the Czech Republic, and 8.7 percent in Croatia. 
Giucci et al.(2007) find that the price of housing in Kiev increased by a factor of five in 
real terms and a factor of over eight in U.S. dollar terms between 2000 and 2007. 
Shelburne and Palacin (2006) find similar large increases in housing prices in a number 
of the former transition economies. Although stock ownership is not widespread in the 
region, the value of stocks has appreciated considerably over the last five years. In chart 
11 the stock market index for 12 of the EEM between 2003 and 2007 is plotted; the 
average of these indexes tripled between 2003 and 2007. The index was up by a factor of 
four in Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania. Most recently, the Athens Exchange ATHEX 
composite was up 17.9 percent during 2007 and the Cyprus CSE was up 23.6 percent.  
These large increases in stock prices probably also approximate the increases in various 




  20Chart 11 
Stock Market Index Appreciation in Selected EEM, 2003-2007  






























































The current reluctance of many non-European (especially Asian) emerging 
markets to become dependent on foreign capital is often alleged to be due to their desire 
not to repeat the situation which led up to the Asian financial crises of 1997-98. Not only 
were the consequences of this “sudden stop” in capital inflows severe, but the IMF 
adjustment programs appeared to only further magnify the problem.  T h i s  d e s i r e  f o r 
current account surpluses may be a temporary choice which allows them an opportunity 
to accumulate a much larger stockpile of international reserves for self-insurance or may 
be a desire to avoid deficits perhaps indefinitely.  The logic above suggests that this 
process has been the result of a conscious process by governments to avoid the mistakes 
of the past. However, the same outcome is possible if the financial sectors have become 
risk averse (due to their previous mistakes in the 1990s) and choose now to be very 
discriminating in their investment decisions; instead of investing in risky domestic 
ventures they prefer to invest in lower return (but less risky) foreign assets. Thus the 
surpluses of the non-European emerging markets need not always be due to a conscious 
policy of the government.     
 
It might be suggested that this desire to avoid the mistakes of the past would be 
greatest in those that had actually experienced crises; however the European emerging 
markets have not been immune to financial crises. For example, the region had a number 
of currency crises including Bulgaria in 1996, the Czech Republic and Romania in 1997, 
Russia in 1998, Turkey in 2000-01, and several speculative attacks against Hungry in 
2003. 
 
An alternative way to assess the importance of saving and investment as an 
explanation for the current account is not to compare these levels across countries as 
examined above but to focus simply on the trend in these three variables over a period of 
time to see how much of the increase in the current account can be accounted for by an 
increase in investment or a reduction in savings.  Rosenberg (2008) has made this 
  21calculation for a number of European economies (his data, however includes Russia) for 
2003-2007 and is duplicated in chart 12 below. The evidence is somewhat mixed in that 
most of those economies, which experienced a decline in the current account over this 
period, experienced both an increase in investment and a decline in savings. For example, 
as shown in chart 12, the increase in Latvia’s current account deficit between 2003 and 
2007 is due equally to an increase in investment and to a decline in savings. On the other 
hand, Bulgaria’s is due almost exclusively to an increase in investment while Serbia’s is 
due exclusively to a decline in savings. Although the evidence appears quite mixed, 
Rosenberg nevertheless concludes that of the two components, investment increases were 
the more important.  
 
Chart 12 
The Change in the Current Account, Savings, and Investment 2003-2007  
 
 
 Source: Taken directly from a presentation by Rosenberg (2008b). 
 
In addition, he seems to suggest that an investment driven current account deficit 
may not be that worrisome. It is probably true that an investment driven current account 
deficit may create less vulnerability than a consumption driven one, simply because the 
country has created a capital stock which can potentially produce items that can be 
exported so as to close a current account deficit or to pay off debt. However, real estate 
investment, which has been significant in the EEM, does not generally have this property. 
Nevertheless, although an investment driven deficit may be less of a problem than a 
consumption driven one, it does not follow that an investment driven deficit is not a 
problem. For example, Thailand experienced a deterioration in its current account from a 
deficit of 3 percent of GDP in 1989 to 8 percent in 1996; over the same period its gross 
domestic savings actually increased from 33 to 36 percent of GDP and its gross capital 
formation increased from 35 to 42 percent of GDP. Thus the deterioration in its current 
account was entirely investment driven; nevertheless disaster struck. Also, the U.S. had a 
current account in balance in 1991 with savings and investment equal to 16.2 percent of 
  22GDP; in 2006 it had a deficit of 6.7 percent of GDP with investment of 20.8 percent and 
savings of 14.1 percent of GDP. Thus using this procedure, of the increase in the current 
account of 6.7 percentage points of GDP, 4.6 percentage points are due to the increase in 
investment and 2.1 percentage points due to the decline in savings.  Thus one would 
conclude that the U.S. current account deficit is due largely to increased investment and 
not to a decline in savings.  However, few are arguing today that the U.S. current account 
deficit presents no problem because it is investment driven or that the problem is that the 
U.S. invests too much. In this sense then emerging Europe is much like the United States, 
and the continued foreign borrowing is not healthy and the solution is the need for higher 
savings. 
 
In summary, in terms of the basic current account identity, the current accounts in 
emerging Europe are due to the fact that savings are low while investment is more normal 
relative to other emerging markets. In terms of why the current account deficits have 
doubled over the last five years regarding trends in savings and investment, the answer is 
a little more ambiguous as investment rates have increased slightly while savings have 
declined slightly. The fact that investment is not particularly high is somewhat surprising 
given the tremendous potential that most of these economies represent. With market 
access, relatively good human capital, an openness to foreign capital and technology,  
many eligible for sizable transfers from the European Union for infrastructure, and 
several able to borrow in the euro market without an emerging market interest premium, 
it might reasonably be expected that these economies would have investment rates 
significantly above the world emerging market average. However, they do not. What 
stands out, however, are the very low rates of savings for these economies. There are a 
large number of explanations as to why savings might be low, but generally it is likely 
that: households are quite optimistic about their future prospects, there are well-
established retirement and safety nets so there is no real need for large amounts of 
precautionary savings, there is a sizable cohort of retirees, consumer loans are 
increasingly available, household wealth has been increasing due to increases in asset 
prices especially for housing which most own without a mortgage, and business savings 
have been kept down by low profits due to overvalued exchange rates. Government 
deficits, one factor commonly associated with low national savings do not appear to be 
important; they are relatively low and in the few cases where they are significant, the 
current account deficits are small.            
 
IV. What Should Be Done About Europe’s Emerging Market Current Account 
Deficits? 
 
  The current account deficits in the European emerging markets are large, in some 
cases clearly unsustainable, and generally the result of private sector savings and 
investment decisions. As discussed above, the economic theory of intertemporal welfare 
maximization suggests that possibly the situation may not need a policy induced 
correction. In addition, it is argued that most of these deficits are not particularly 
worrisome because a significant proportion of them are being financed by FDI, which is 
relatively stable. However, if a currency or financial crises were to occur, the FDI inflows 
are far from guaranteed and the costs would be borne by many groups other than those 
making these savings and investment decisions. As such, there would seem to be a strong 
reason that governments may wish to lower these current account deficits to more 
  23sustainable levels. In deciding what action might be optimal, one question that must be 
addressed is, what would happen to investment if capital inflows were reduced? Would 
investment fall or would savings increase?  Although the evidence is mixed and it is not 
possible to answer this question in a theoretically unequivocal manner (that being, cross-
sectional patterns or time series trends are only suggestive of what might happen), the 
overwhelming conclusion is that foreign capital inflows into the region have reduced 
domestic savings more than increased investment so that although investment may suffer 
it is primarily consumption that would decline.    
 
In analyzing how increased access to foreign capital markets has affected savings 
and investment, there is much evidence to suggest that it is savings that often falls as 
much as investment increases. For example, a drop in savings from increased access to 
international capital markets characterized what happened to Portugal in the second half 
of the 1990s as it became clear that it would be adopting the future euro. A similar pattern 
was first observed by Ingram (1962) in his analysis of the effects of large capital inflows 
into Puerto Rico back in the 1950s when it dollarized.  
 
In order to contemplate appropriate policy action, it is worth discussing slightly 
the underlying channels that these capital inflows are taking. As previously discussed, in 
a number of these economies there is a significant presence of foreign banks in their 
financial sectors. The branch banks in the EEM have increasingly been borrowing funds 
from their parent banks in order to fund their operations, as domestic deposits have been 
limited by the low savings in these economies. These banks have also had a tendency to 
lend to the nontraded service sector and to households for personal loans and mortgages 
instead of to the traded sectors. The rate of credit expansion has been extremely fast, and 
although the overall credit to GDP ratios are low relative to advanced economy norms, 
there are significant questions as to whether the newly established financial systems 
including the institutional regulatory structures are sufficient to handle such a rapid 
expansion. Empirical research shows that the rapid growth of non-government credit is a 
significant factor in predicting financial crises in emerging markets. In addition, since the 
funds obtained from the parent banks are mostly denominated in euros, which is a foreign 
currency except for the few euro members, the branches have attempted to minimize their 
exposure to foreign exchange risks by making foreign-currency denominated loans. 
Although making euro denominated loans has reduced the direct exposure of the banking 
sector to exchange risks, the problem has just been shifted on to consumers and 
businesses which do not have a hedge against these risks and are therefore even less 
prepared to deal with them. As a result, for the banks, the lessened vulnerability from 
exchange risks has been replaced by an increased vulnerability from consumer default. 
      
These trends are worrisome: the EEM are essentially selling debt and not equity, 
the loans are going for consumption and investment in the non-traded service and 
housing sectors, the expansion of credit is too fast for existing institutions to handle, and 
the foreign-currency denominated loans are exposing the borrowers to balance sheet 
effects if a domestic depreciation were to occur (Shelburne, 2007). And given the current 
account deficits, depreciations can not be ruled out.  On the positive side, it has also been 
argued that the foreign bank loans are not as bad as the data would suggest because much 
of this is borrowing by subsidiaries from foreign parents and thus the possibility of a 
sudden stop is less likely. The parent banks appear to have made investments in these 
  24European emerging markets as part of a long-run strategy to establish their presence in 
these economies instead of being motivated by short-term interest rate differentials. Thus 
they are unlikely to withdraw significantly from these markets when conditions 
deteriorate. Nevertheless, it is also the case that these large multinational banks are 
invested in a number of these economies, and thus there is an increased possibility of 
contagion if a problem should develop in one of the EEM.  
 
In many of the NMS the current account deficits are quite high and pose 
significant risks for the region; it is interesting to point out that the current account was 
one variable that should probably have been included, but is absent, in the Maastricht 
criteria for euro accession.   
 
The underlying price trends which would allow a smooth reduction in the current 
account deficits are not encouraging. This is especially important in those economies 
with fixed exchange rates (even more so for currency board economies), since the only 
way that the current account can be corrected is for productivity to increase faster than 
wages so as to improve international competitiveness. In the Baltic economies, wages are 
currently rising at an annual rate of around 20 percent while real income (which can 
roughly be a proxy for productivity) is rising at an annual rate of only about 10 percent.  
Thus, despite already large current account deficits, their external competitiveness is 
actually deteriorating instead of improving. The only encouraging aspect of these trends 
is the high nominal values. Thus if wage growth could be brought down to only a few 
percent, competitiveness could improve rather quickly. This contrasts with the much 
more difficult situation where wages and productivity are growing slowly; this case 
would require a decline in nominal wages in order to significantly reduce real wages and 
thereby improve competitiveness. The experiences of those with fixed exchange rates (or 
those already in the eurozone) in regaining competitiveness through this differential 
between wage gains and productivity growth are not encouraging. The only partial 
success has been Germany which has increased its competitiveness over the last ten years 
by keeping wage increases below its productivity increases. However, these types of 
adjustment are quite difficult and costly in terms of higher unemployment, but there 
would appear to be little alternative for these fixed exchange rate economies. Given this 
situation, policies to increase product and labor market flexibility are warranted as a way 
to reduce these adjustment costs, but these invariably have negative distributional 
consequences (Shelburne, 2005). The flexible exchange rate economies have the option 
of depreciation but in those with significant foreign-currency denominated loans, this 
option has serious drawbacks.    
 
Given the limitations on using exchange rate policy and the difficulty of regaining 
competitiveness through low wage growth, are there any other viable policy options for 
addressing these current account deficits? Unfortunately the tool kit available for 
addressing this issue is somewhat limited. Fiscal policy can play a role as increased taxes 
(or reduced expenditures) can increase public savings, lower interest rates, and reduce 
income growth. Higher corporate taxes would have the additional attraction of perhaps 
limiting capital inflows. As shown below in chart 13 there has been an ongoing “race to 
the bottom” in corporate tax rates as a way to encourage foreign investment; now that 
capital inflows are perhaps excessive, this trend could be reversed. Monetary policy is of 
limited value, as those with fixed exchange rates have no flexibility, due to the trilemma 
  25of international finance which emasculates monetary policy when exchange rates are 
fixed with open capital mobility.  Regulatory changes to limit asset appreciation by 
making mortgages harder to get may be necessary as might limitations of foreign-
currency denominated loans.  
 
Chart 13 
































































     Capital flows into the European emerging markets have been even greater than 
the level the current accounts would suggest, as some of the capital inflows have been re-
exported through international reserve accumulation.  Obviously larger levels of 
international reserves provide some additional collateral and would be desirable as a way 
to insure against a sudden stop or mitigate its effects if one were to occur; they would 
also allow the authorities more flexibility to maintain exchange rates during a short 
slowdown in capital inflows. However, reserve accumulation has not been as significant 
in the EEM as in many other regions of the world. Their current reserve levels would not 
be sufficient if a major “sudden stop” were to occur.  However, the accumulation of 
international reserves is not a totally independent policy choice but is more often an 
endogenous outcome of the monetary and exchange rate policy mix. For those countries 
with fixed exchange rates, a tighter monetary policy with sterilization can increase 
reserves, but this leads to increased external holdings on domestic bonds, so there is not 
much of a net improvement. For economies with flexible exchange rates, increased non-
sterilized intervention can increase reserves but this will increase inflation which will 
result in a further deterioration of the current account; higher reserves but a larger current 
account is unlikely to increase stability. Thus the option of increasing international 
reserves creates its own set of new problems.             
 
There is some further endogeneity in the sense that sometimes capital inflows 
directly create their own additional imports (and thus worsen the current account 
directly); thus if the capital inflows were to dry up the current account would improve 
automatically. This is in addition to the usual channels whereby lower capital inflows 
lower imports by lowering the exchange rate or reducing income growth. Given that most 
  26of these economies are not major producers of capital goods, additional inflows that 
create additional investment may result in a high propensity to import capital goods. Thus 
a reduction in capital inflows would lead to an immediate improvement in the current 
account by reducing imports of capital goods. Given these complications with the policy 
options and endogeneity, some exogenous factor that reduced capital inflows might be a 
welcomed development, and the 2007 credit crisis proved to be such as exogenous factor.    
 
V. The 2007 Credit Crisis: The Beginning of the End? 
 
The world experienced a significant credit crisis (stemming from the U.S. sub-
prime mortgage crisis) beginning in August 2007 which is and will continue to have 
significant implications for the European emerging markets. As a result of the tightening 
of global credit and the re-pricing of risks, the credit rankings of some of the European 
emerging economies have declined and the spreads which they must pay have increased 
as shown in chart 14. In addition Rosenberg (2008b) finds that the increase in credit 
spreads is correlated with the size of the current account as shown below in chart 15.  
 
Chart 14 
Credit Crisis Effects on Credit Spreads in Emerging Europe 
 
Source: FitchRatings (2008) with original data from Datastream. 
 
Although the domestic banks in these economies were not significant holders of 
US subprime mortgage-backed securities and were much more prudent about making 
“subprime type” loans themselves, a number of their foreign parents did have some 
exposure to subprime securities. However, more importantly, these parent banks have 
been obtaining significant funding from global capital markets, and with the global credit 
crunch this source of funding is much more constrained. Domestic deposits are unlikely 
to grow to compensation for the lack of external financing.  Thus as a result of tighter 
global credit conditions and their own or their parents’ balance sheet problems, the 
emerging European banking systems are unable to continue to supply credit at the same 
levels as previously. One of the fundamental characteristics of a banking system is that it 
assumes the risks of having short-term deposits and long-term loans. These banks have 
thus made long-term loans under the expectation that they would be able to continue to 
roll over their liabilities at roughly a similar interest rate. Similarly, businesses in these 
  27economies have borrowed funds to make longer-term investments with the intention of 
rolling over their shorter term loans until the investments matured. With the tightening of 
credit conditions, the ability to roll over this debt has declined, or the cost of doing so has 
increased substantially. As time goes on this problem of illiquidity can turn into a 
problem of solvency through a number of channels. For example, asset markets such as 
housing have a price level based upon the assumption that new entrants will be able to 
continue to enter the market and will be able to continue to obtain financing. When 
financing is not available, the demand for these assets falls along with their prices. The 
fall in prices can wipe out the capital or equity of the owner, at which point they may 
default on loans or declare bankruptcy.  As a result banks become even more cautious 
about lending and a vicious cycle can develop. The longer the tight credit conditions 
remain, the more likely there will be contractions in business activity and bankruptcies. 
This process is very much underway in a number of these European emerging economies.   
 
Chart 15 
Credit Spreads in EEM and Current Account Deficits 
 
 















































































For example in Estonia, the economy contracted in the first quarter of 2008 by 0.5 
percent (quarter-on-quarter), and annualized credit growth fell to 24.5 percent in April 
2008 compared to 43.3 percent in April 2007. So far investment and growth have been 
maintained in the export-oriented manufacturing sectors while most of the downturn has 
been concentrated in the real estate sector. As discussed, although real estate has 
probably experienced excessive appreciation, there is no general oversupply of housing 
(as in the U.S.) in these economies. The degree to which the slowdown is able to begin to 
reduce the longer-term (cyclically adjusted) current account deficit will depend on the 
degree to which it moderates wage growth so as to improve the competitiveness of 
Estonian export firms.  
  
The current credit crisis, however, is not the only “shock” that has impacted the 
European emerging markets; the other is the commodity price boom. This shock is 
largely a negative shock for the European emerging markets as they are net importers of 
  28energy and commodities. As a result, this will further deteriorate their current accounts 
and thus further compound the challenges they face. In addition, the economic slowdown 
which has accompanied the crisis will affect the exports of the European emerging 
markets and their ability to service their debt. In addition to the credit crisis and the 
accompanying economic slowdown, another development that has increased the risks 
associated with lending to many of the European Union NMS is that their dates for euro 
accession are being pushed further and further into the future. Other than Slovakia, 
accession is now estimated to be more than five years away for most of the other NMS. 
There are a number of factors, but their difficulty in controlling inflation is probably the 
most important (UN, 2008, box IV.I) Thus lenders can not rely on the fact that borrowers 
in these economies will be paying back domestic currency debt and thus must be   
concerned about the potential for a currency depreciation in the coming years. In 
addition, EU accession for Turkey and much of south-east Europe is either more in doubt 
or likely to be, much further in the future.  Overall then, the days of minimum risks and a 
sea of credit are now over, and as a result obtaining external finance will be more 
difficult, and that suggests there is likely to be some correction in their current accounts. 
As with the United States, the fundamental question is whether there will be a soft 




The current account deficits in the European emerging markets have more than 
doubled over the last five years. By many measures they are too large and probably 
unsustainable. However, at the same time they may not be as risky as the large 
magnitudes might suggest due to the fact that many of them are financed by what should 
be relatively stable inflows of FDI.  Although there is some empirical justification for this 
in the sense that FDI flows have proven to be rather stable even during financial 
disturbances, there is no absolute guarantee that this need be the case. In addition, 
increasingly the percentage of the current account covered by FDI has been declining in a 
number of economies as they are increasingly relying on borrowing from foreign banks. 
This poses a number of additional risks, and policy action is needed to reverse this 
development. The financial turmoil that began in August 2007 with U.S. sub-prime 
mortgage securities has so far had only a limited impact on the region although in almost 
all cases the interest rate spreads for private sector borrowers in this region have 
increased.  If the adjustments induced by this crisis can be achieved slowly, the crisis 
may prove to have been a blessing in disguise. Nevertheless, there is the possibility that 
the required adjustments may come too fast, in which case there could be significant 
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 Appendix Table 1- Current Account Deficits in Emerging Europe (Millions $) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Albania  -65 -155 -156 -217 -408 -407 -358 -571 -671  -1040 
Armenia  -418 -307 -278 -200 -148 -189 -162 -193 -117 -312 
Belarus  -1016 -194 -338 -411 -326  -434 -1194  434 -1512 -2750 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  -345 -501 -396 -743  -1191 -1631 -1840 -2156 -1233 -1713 
Bulgaria  -49 -659 -698 -990 -874  -1698 -1627 -3258 -4991 -7524 
Croatia  -1477  -1406 -533 -729  -1926 -2162 -1898 -2571 -3223 -4012 
Cyprus  -605 -217 -455 -314 -394 -300 -789 -951  -1091  -1118 
Czech  Republic  -1275 -1468 -2690 -3273 -4265 -5785 -5749 -1939 -4586 -4998 
Estonia  -480 -245 -299 -337 -716  -1113 -1457 -1440 -2418 -3280 
Georgia  -276 -198 -269 -212 -231 -384 -421 -763  -1235  -1542 
Greece  -5948 -8618 -9820 -9400 -9582 -12804 -13476 -18233 -29565 -37234 
Hungary  -2279 -3763 -4011 -3193 -4637 -6701 -8584 -7565 -6206 -4897 
Latvia  -640 -648 -380 -633 -615 -919 -1802 -2031 -4279 -6500 
Lithuania  -1290  -1201 -680 -573 -721 -1278 -1725 -1831 -3218 -4410 
Malta  -216 -126 -481 -150  106 -156 -342 -517 -421 -609 
Moldova  -335 -79  -108 -37 -25 -130  -47 -248 -392 -582 
Montenegro  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. -115 -149 -191 -642 -608 
Poland  -6901  -12487 -9981 -5375 -5009  -4599 -10693  -4775 -11084 -12500 
Portugal  -8495 -10426 -11690 -11458 -10325  -9547 -13804 -18001 -18316 -18098 
Romania  -2889 -1440 -1379 -2229 -1524 -3248 -6337 -8546  -12660  -15019 
Serbia  -469 -455 -153 -285  -1247  -1420 -2869 -2224 -3656 -4160 
Slovakia  -1982 -980 -694  -1746  -1939  -276 -1447 -4090 -4561 -3028 
Slovenia  -122 -704 -534  34  235 -220 -891 -680 -946  -1123 
Spain  -7098 -18076 -22990 -24007 -22385 -31019 -54855 -83096  -106305  -141339 
The fYR of Macedonia  -270  -32  -72 -244 -358 -149 -415  -81  -24 -249 
Turkey  1986 -1337 -9824  3393 -1521  -8036 -15601 -22603 -32774 -39054 
Ukraine  -1296 1658 1481 1402 3174 2891 6909 2531  -1617  -4680 
            
SEU-3  -21541 -37120 -44500 -44865 -42292  -53370  -82135 -119330 -154186 -196671 
NMS-12  -18728 -23938 -22299 -18792 -20404 -26371 -41462 -37582 -58122 -73269 
SEE-7  -640 -3886  -11134  1175 -6651  -13920 -22930 -30217 -42223 -50836 
CIS-5  -3341  880  488  542 2444 1754 5085 1902  -4873  -9866 
Total  -44250 -64064 -77445 -61940 -66902  -91907 -141442 -185227 -259405 -330642 Appendix Table 2- Current Accounts in European Emerging Markets as a Percentage of GDP, 1998-2007 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Albania  -2.4 -4.5 -4.3 -5.3 -9.2 -7.1 -4.9 -7.0 -9.9 -10.1
Armenia -22.1  -16.6 -14.6 -9.4 -6.2 -6.7  -4.5 -3.9 -1.4 -4.0
Belarus  -6.7 -1.6 -3.2 -3.3 -2.2 -2.4 -5.2 1.4 -4.1 -7.1
Bosnia & Herzegovina  -8.2  -10.7 -7.8 -14.0 -19.3 -19.5 -18.4 -20.0 -11.7 -12.7
Bulgaria  -0.4 -5.0 -5.5 -7.2 -5.6 -8.5 -6.6 -12.0 -15.8 -19.3
Croatia  -6.8 -7.1 -2.5 -3.6 -8.3 -7.2 -5.3 -6.6 -7.6 -8.0
Cyprus  -6.3 -2.2 -4.9 -3.2 -3.7 -2.3 -5.0 -5.6 -5.9 -5.5
Czech  Republic  -2.1 -2.4 -4.8 -5.3 -5.6 -6.2 -6.0 -2.6 -4.2 -3.0
Estonia -8.4  -4.3 -5.3 -5.4 -9.8 -11.3  -12.2 -10.3 -14.6 -16.0
Georgia  -7.6 -7.1 -8.8 -6.6 -6.8 -9.6 -8.2 -11.9 -16.0 -16.1
Greece  -4.4 -6.3 -7.8 -7.1 -6.5 -6.6 -5.9 -7.4 -11.0 -11.7
Hungary  -4.7 -7.6 -8.4 -6.0 -7.0 -7.9 -8.4 -6.8 -5.5 -3.6
Latvia -9.7  -9.0 -4.8 -7.6 -6.6 -8.1  -13.0 -12.6 -21.1 -23.5
Lithuania -11.5  -11.0 -6.0 -4.7 -5.1 -6.8 -7.7 -7.2 -10.8 -12.1
Malta  -5.7 -3.2 -12.4 -3.8 2.4 -3.1 -6.3 -8.0 -6.2 -9.4
Moldova  -19.7 -6.7 -8.4 -2.5 -1.5 -6.6 -1.8 -8.3 -11.7 -14.5
Montenegro ..  .. .. .. .. -7.3  -7.2 -8.6 -26.5 -21.2
Poland  -4.0 -7.4 -5.8 -2.8 -2.5 -2.1 -4.2 -1.6 -3.3 -5.1
Portugal  -7.1 -8.6 -10.4 -9.9 -8.1 -6.1 -7.7 -9.7 -9.4 -8.2
Romania  -6.6 -3.9 -3.6 -5.3 -3.2 -5.5 -8.4 -8.6 -10.3 -9.5
Serbia -3.1  -4.9 -2.1 -2.5 -7.9 -7.0  -11.7 -8.5 -11.5 -10.3
Slovakia  -8.9 -4.8 -3.4 -8.3 -7.9 -0.8 -3.4 -8.6 -8.3 -4.2
Slovenia  -0.7 -4.0 -3.2 0.2 1.1 -0.8 -2.7 -1.9 -2.5 -2.5
Spain  -1.2 -2.9 -4.0 -3.9 -3.3 -3.5 -5.3 -7.4 -8.6 -10.0
The fYR of Macedonia  -7.5  -0.9 -2.0 -7.1 -9.5 -3.2  -7.7 -1.4 -0.4 -3.4
Turkey  1.0 -0.7 -4.9 2.3 -0.8 -3.4 -5.2 -6.3 -8.2 -8.1
Ukraine -3.1  5.2 4.7 3.7 7.5 5.8  10.6 2.9 -1.5 -3.6
            
SEU-3  -3.0 -4.2 -5.5 -5.2 -4.4 -4.3 -5.7 -7.7 -9.1 -10.1
NMS-12  -4.5 -5.8 -5.5 -4.2 -4.1 -4.5 -5.8 -4.5 -6.2 -6.4
SEE-7  -0.3 -1.7 -4.7 0.6 -2.8 -4.5 -5.9 -6.7 -8.4 -8.4
CIS-5  -5.2 1.8 1.0 0.9 3.8 2.3 5.1 1.5 -3.0 -5.2
ALL  EEM  -2.8 -4.1 -5.1 -4.0 -3.8 -4.1 -5.4 -6.3 -7.9 -8.5
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17.9 21.3 22.0 16.8 16.1 20.6 26.5 32.2 31.9 25.5 25.9 23.6 25.6
23.5 18.4 20.0 19.1 19.1 18.4 18.6 19.8 21.7 24.3 24.9 29.7 30.4
 Belarus 32.9 24.8 23.5 26.8 26.7 23.7 25.4 23.8 22.2 26.6 30.5 29.6 30.5
 Bosnia-Herzegovina    ..   20.0 41.2 42.0 38.0 28.0 21.2 19.4 20.1 20.4 18.8 19.2    ..  
 Bulgaria 9.4 15.7 8.1 9.9 16.9 17.9 18.3 20.7 19.8 21.7 23.1 27.4 31.9
 Croatia 17.4 17.6 21.9 27.5 24.0 23.0 20.2 23.9 29.1 31.1 30.6 31.0 30.2
 Cyprus 25.5 22.0 22.3 19.8 20.0 18.7    ..       ..      ..       ..      ..      ..      ..  
 Czech Republic 29.8 32.4 33.5 30.3 28.3 27.0 29.3 29.4 28.4 27.0 27.4 26.1 27.3
 Estonia 27.0 26.6 27.0 30.4 30.3 24.9 28.7 28.1 32.4 33.0 36.2 35.2 38.2
 Georgia 2.6 4.0 19.7 18.0 21.0 22.1 21.6 21.9 22.1 24.4 28.3 26.7 28.7
 Greece 18.8 18.5 19.4 19.6 20.9 22.0 23.4 23.5 23.6 25.3 25.2 23.8    ..  
 Hungary 22.2 22.6 25.5 26.6 28.9 28.7 30.5 26.8 25.6 25.1 26.0 23.6 22.9
 Latvia 19.1 14.3 17.4 19.5 24.1 23.4 23.7 26.6 26.7 28.8 33.2 34.4 38.0
 Lithuania 18.4 22.1 20.4 24.2 25.4 22.3 19.8 20.6 22.1 23.2 24.0 25.1 28.1
 Macedonia, FYR 15.5 20.8 20.1 21.0 22.3 19.7 22.3 19.1 20.6 20.0 21.4 20.0 22.1
 Malta 30.7 32.0 28.6 25.6 23.7 24.0 25.4 18.5 14.0 17.5 18.2 23.1    ..  
 Moldova 28.8 24.9 24.2 23.8 26.8 22.9 23.9 20.0 21.7 23.2 25.3 29.1 30.8
 Montenegro    ..      ..      ..      ..      ..      ..   21.4 23.0 17.6 16.6 20.5 21.8 21.6
 Poland 17.7 18.7 20.9 23.4 25.1 25.2 24.8 20.8 18.6 18.8 20.1 19.2 20.3
 Portugal 22.4 23.3 23.6 25.6 27.3 27.8 27.7 27.1 25.2 22.8 22.9 22.3 ..  
 Romania 24.8 24.3 25.9 20.6 17.7 16.1 19.5 22.6 21.7 21.8 22.3 22.6 23.9
 Serbia    ..       ..      ..   12.1 9.1 10.3 8.4 15.9 17.2 22.6 32.0 22.5 21.5
 Slovak Republic 20.6 24.3 33.7 34.0 33.5 27.6 25.9 29.6 29.0 24.6 26.0 29.2 29.0
 Slovenia 20.6 22.9 22.7 23.9 25.1 27.5 26.8 24.1 23.4 24.7 26.8 26.0 27.5
 Spain 21.1 21.9 21.7 22.1 23.5 25.1 26.3 26.3 26.6 27.5 28.3 29.7    ..  
 Turkey 21.5 25.5 24.6 25.1 24.2 23.4 24.5 16.8 21.3 22.8 25.7 24.8 27.0
 Ukraine 35.3 26.7 22.7 21.4 20.8 17.5 20.3 21.8 20.1 22.0 19.1 18.4 17.4
Emerging Europe  21.8 21.8 23.6 23.4 23.8 22.6 23.3 23.2 23.2 23.9 25.5 25.5 27.3
World 22.2 22.3 22.2 22.5 22.2 22.0 22.3 21.3 20.5 20.7 21.4   ..     ..
Middle Income 27.4 26.9 26.7 26.6 25.0 23.8 24.3 23.8 23.7 24.8 26.3 26.2 26.0
East Asia & Pacific 39.4 39.5 38.4 36.1 32.2 31.3 31.6 32.3 33.4 36.1 37.6 37.7 35.8
Latin America 21.3 19.5 19.7 21.4 21.2 19.5 19.9 18.9 17.6 17.6 19.5 19.5 19.6
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 Albania
 Armenia
  
 